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T
oday, when ethnic identity and nation-build­
ing have assumed a hegemonic place in the 
programs of A A ASS conventions, at the 
recent World Congress in Tampere, and in 
specialist organizations such as the Association for 
the Study of Nationalities, it is difficult for the 
current generation of social science and humanities 
scholars to realize that these issues were decidedly at 
the margins of earlier Sovietological agendas. But 
that same generation—my generation to a large 
degree—that today lovingly cites Benedict Ander­
son, Anthony Smith, Ernest Gellner, and Rogers 
Brubaker—to name only a few of the late-20th- 
century social science “revisionists” of national 
identity—looks back far less often at the work of 
those who have labored patiently and quietly for 
several decades within our own Sovietological 
vineyards.
Roman Szporluk, the Mykhailo Hrushevskyi
Professor of History and Director of the Ukrainian 
Research Institute at Harvard University, is the 
author of several books devoted to twentieth- 
century East and Central European intellectual 
history, including: The Political 'Thought of Thomas G. 
Masaryk (Boulder, 1981), a study of the “father” of 
modern Czechoslovakia; Communism andLLationalism: 
Karl Marx versus Friedrich Last (Oxford, 1988); and an 
annotated, translated edition of Russia in World 
History (Ann Arbor, 1970) by Mikhail Pokrovsky, 
the dean of the “new” Soviet historians of the 1920s 
who, for his efforts to write a global history based 
on historical materialism and internationalism, 
suffered disgrace under Stalin. The volume under 
review, Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet 
Union, brings together a selection of Szporluk's 
essays spanning twenty-five years between 1972 and 
1997. Their greatest contribution is to the rethinking 
of the postwar period of Ukrainian, Russian, and 
Soviet history, including post-Soviet developments. 
The essays also illustrate how broadly informed, 
good old-fashioned Kremlinology can help us better 
understand Soviet politics and post-Soviet develop­
ments through the prism of “the nationality ques­
tion” in Russian and Soviet history. Because most 
of the essays were written before the relevant 
archives were opened in Ukraine and Russia,
Szporluk posed interesting questions to a wide 
range of available published sources: Soviet 
ethnographers' studies and demographic statistics, 
urban geography, education, press, and language 
policy, ideological pronouncements, even fictional 
literature. But he was also constantly scouring the 
latest social science literature on nationalism for 
additional insights and comparative perspectives, 
including such partly forgotten classics as the works 
of Plans Kohn, John Armstrong, Frederick 
Barghoorn, and Karl Deutsch.
The essays give us a preview of some of the 
major outlines and themes of Szporluk's forthcom­
ing history of modern Ukraine. The histories of 
both Ukraine and Russia, or more accurately their 
historiographies, after a half-century of Cold War 
divisions and struggles, and with archives opened 
wide, are ripe for reconceptualization. Perhaps 
because Szporluk's work has been so focused on 
ideas, particularly geopolitical and historiographical 
ones, his own reflections on modern Ukrainian and 
Russian history are very suggestive of such new 
avenues of conceptualization? It is on those larger 
themes and conceptualizations that I want to focus 
in this essay.2
Particularly in this aspect, Szporluk's essays recall a 
respected tradition in Ukrainian historical writing in the 
diaspora of raising important intellectual and historiographical 
issues for future historians, even when the hope of archival 
access remained distant. The most influential such collection 
has been the writings of Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky, Essays in 
Modem Ukrainian History (Edmonton, 1987); an important 
collection on Galician Ukraine edited by .Andrei S. Markovits 
and Prank E. Sysyn, Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism 
(Cambridge, 1982); and on early modern history, edited by 
Ivo Banac and Prank Sysyn, Concepts of Nationhood in Ear/y 
Modem Eastern Europe (Cambridge, 1986). Por a still earlier 
period Ihor Sevcenko recently brought several of his essays 
together in a provocative and learned volume, Ukraine Between 
East and driest (Edmonton, 1996).
I have been grappling with many of these themes in my 
own research and writing: "Docs Ukraine Have a History?" 
Slavic Review (fall 1995); "Writing the History of Russia as 
Empire," in Ospovat, livtukhov, Gasparov and von Hagen, 
eds., Kayrn', Moscow, St. Petersburg: Multiple Faces of the Russian 
Empire (Moscow, 1997); with Karen Barkey, eds., After Empire: 
Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building (Boulder, Colorado, 
1997); "Federalism, Rcgionalisms and 1’an-Movements as Rc-
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Russia, Ukraine, Empire, Nation
Szporluk's overarching concern has been with 
the state- and nation-building his tor)' of Eastern and 
East Central Europe. The cases he highlights in this 
collection are Ukraine and Russia, in their various 
editions in the modern period. He argues that the 
fates of these two contemporary states have been 
historically interwoven in ways that are full of 
ironies and paradoxes. And today, he argues fur­
ther, their separate state- and nation-building pro­
jects continue to influence each other in profound 
ways.
The central nationality question for Eastern 
Europe, Szporluk reminds us in a very sobering 
reversal of the traditional focus on the non-Rus­
sians, is the Russian question,* 3 by which he means 
the urgent imperative for Russian elites to transform 
their state's self-identity from an imperial to a 
national one as a crucial component of Russia's 
political modernization. What Szporluk describes as 
the Soviet Union’s own version of imperialism has 
its roots in Stalin’s russification policies; the conse­
quence has been a confused and dialectical relation­
ship between Russianness and Soviet communism. 
He insists that while desovietization and shedding 
the imperial legacy are two distinct processes, they 
are also intertwined in complicated ways because the 
Soviet Union and Soviet identity, such as it existed, 
became perceived by non-Russians as Russian, even 
if the ethnic Russian population, or at least some of 
its leading intellectuals, felt itself denied national 
self-expression in the Soviet Union. The new 
national identity (rosstiskit, presumably) that 
Szporluk clearly prefers for Russia is one we would 
call civic or territorial, not ethnic. In other words, 
citizens of Russia must come to see themselves 
primarily not as ethnic Russians (russkie) allied with 
other Russians outside the borders of today's 
Russian Federation, but as accepting the sovereignty
of those borders and the multiethnic population 
that lives within them.4 *
Much of the same is true for post-Soviet 
Ukraine, which paradoxically inherited a civic- 
territorial version of a Ukrainian nation from Soviet 
institutions and practice; however, that achievement 
is threatened today by extremists both within 
Ukraine and without (especially in Russia) who seek 
to ethnicize politics and identity in ways that 
Szporluk fears would lead to violence. Instead of 
the ethnic nationalism (or nationalizing states) that 
most scholars look for (and find), Szporluk devotes 
several chapters to defining better (and on Ukrai­
nian material) what we understand by civic-territo­
rial identities and loyalties? How have Ukrainians 
been able to think about themselves and their state 
without emphasizing ethnicity and even language? 
In a particularly ingenious borrowing from the 
literature of urban and regional geography, Szporluk 
traces how Kyiv achieved the status of “primate 
city” in Ukraine; he interprets the 1959 census data 
as evidence that Kyiv was perceived and accepted by 
most Ukrainians, east, west or south, as their histor­
ically legitimate capital and major city.
The status of the capital in the rank-order of 
major Ukrainian cities became an important factor 
in Ukrainian citizens’ capacity to imagine a Ukrai­
nian territorial state. (Kyiv only became the capital 
of Soviet Ukraine in 1934, after it was transferred 
there from Khar'kiv.)6 Here Szporluk demonstrates 
how important the postwar period of Soviet and 
Ukrainian history' is proving to be in better under­
standing contemporary politics and identities in the 
region. His observations are grounded in analyses
imaginings in/of the Russian Empire," unpublished paper; 
and most extensively in the collborative research project (with 
Andreas Kappeler, Erank Sysyn, and Zenon Kohut),
"Peoples, Nations, and Identities: The Russian-Ukrainian 
Encounter" (with funding from the NEH, the Alexander- 
von-I Iumboldt Stiftung, and the Canadian Institute of 
Ukrainian Studies).
3 Indeed, Szporluk relies on a much richer literature on
the non-Russian nations than he is able to for the Russians
themselves. Besides an unjustly forgotten study by Frederick 
Barghoorn, Soviet Russian Nationalism (New York, 1956), 
Szporluk turns to more recent studies of Russian nationalism. 
See Yitzhak M. Brudny, Reinventing Russia: Russian Nationalism 
and the Soviet State, 1953-91 (Cambridge, 1998); John Dunlop,
The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism (Princeton, 1983); 
and Alexander Yanov, The Russian New Righl (Berkeley, 1978).
4 Chapters 1 anti 16 allow the reader to sec the continuity 
in Szporluk's concerns while also charting a considerable- 
evolution of his thought in response to important changes in 
post-Soviet politics.
5 Szporluk's reflections on civic-territorial identity' are 
especially developed in chapter 5. Here and elsewhere he 
takes issue with Rogers Brubaker and David Eaitin, and the 
many scholars who have followed in their theoretical and 
methodological footsteps, on their notion of the 
"nationalizing state" pursuing an ethnicization of politics, 
culture and identity.
6 Szporluk borrows the concepts via the writings of 
Chauncey Harris {Cities of the Soviet Union: Studies in Their 
Functions, Si^e, Density, and Growth, 1970) and David Hooson 
(The Soviet Union: People and Regions, 1966) and applies them to 




of changes in ideology and policy, as well as demo­
graphic and ethnographic trends.7
The Soviet West and Eastern Europe
But, of course, the Ukrainian-Russian relation­
ship does not exist nor has it evolved in a geo­
political and intellectual vacuum. Another major 
theme of Szporluk's essays is the enduring impor­
tance of both Eastern and East Central Europe 
more generally but also what he calls Far Eastern 
Europe, or the Soviet West, in particular, for the 
Ukrainian-Russian relationship and for the fate of 
Empire, whether Russian or Soviet. This region 
includes the historic kresy of Poland (territory today 
shared by Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine), Latvia, 
Estonia, Moldova and other contiguous territories 
contested by Romania, Russia and the Ottoman 
Empire at various points in the past. Szporluk 
contends that the western half of the Russian 
Empire, and later the Soviet Union, proved to be a 
constant threat to the imperial order by undermin­
ing its legitimacy; the populations of this region 
were more “European” than the Russians them­
selves and have not ever been successfully inte­
grated into the Moscow-centered state. What 
Szporluk means by the region's “European” or 
“Europeanizing” character is that it was a conduit 
for and translator of modern ideas and institutions, 
especially national ones, from western Europe into 
the Russian Empire and Soviet Union. The relations 
of the Russians with other parts of their empire, 
especially the Turko-Muslim worlds, were also 
fraught with tensions and contradictions, but inso­
far as the imperial and Soviet elites thought of 
themselves as European or modern (or wanted to 
be so regarded by others), it was the relationships 
with and attitudes toward this Soviet/Russian Far 
West that were more urgent to those elites' self­
understanding.8 *
7 Szporluk explores how postwar urbanization processes 
helped reconfigure the status and prestige of Kyiv in chapters 
3 and 5. For other explorations of non-ethnic Ukrainian 
nationalisms, see the work of two anthropologists and a 
historian: Catherine Wanner, Burden of Dreams: History and 
Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine (Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1998); and Adriana Pctryna, "Sarcophagus: Chernobyl 
in Historical Light," Cultural Anthropology, 10 (2): 196-220, 
1995; "Technical Error: Measures of Life After Chernobyl," 
Social Identities, 4 (1): 73-92, 1997; Amir Weiner, Slaking Sense 
of War (Princeton University Press, 2001).
8 This thesis is presented most succinctly in chapter 9 of
the current collection, but is explored more fully in an earlier 
volume of essays edited by Professor Szporluk, The Influence of 
East Europe and the Soviet West on Soviet Society (New York,
During the nineteenth century Poland's several 
rebellions turned out to be “too much for Russia to 
swallow,” but nationalist ideas were attracting large 
audiences in Finland and among the Baltic peoples 
as well. After the disintegration of the Russian 
Empire in the wake of the First World War, the 
Bolshevik state lost those western territories until 
the start of World War II. In its moment of great­
est triumph in war, the Soviet Union annexed its Far 
West and then consolidated its empire in postwar 
Eastern Europe; ironically, that annexation brought 
with it alien political cultures that could not be 
entirely Sovietized out of existence. Szporluk's very' 
original contribution here is to focus on the period 
1939-47 as a transformative moment, a historical 
turning point, whose contradictory outcome eventu­
ally undermined the Soviet solution to the “national 
question” that had been hammered out in the 
interwar years.
Of course, in a set of writings that are so wide- 
ranging and, in many cases, speculative or provoca­
tive, there are bound to be some issues of conten­
tion between historians who have had different 
“groundings” and who therefore look at putatively 
the same processes and events from somewhat 
different perspectives. Most of the concerns I raise 
in Professor Szporluk's work are questions of 
emphasis and degree of generalizability. One set of 
questions revolves around the concept of the 
(Soviet) West and that region's crucial contribution 
to the destabilization of the Russian Empire and 
Soviet Union. First, how coherent is the concept of 
a historical Soviet West to begin with, when the 
differences and similarities are difficult to balance in 
the end? Estonia and Latvia differ in important 
ways from Lithuania even among the Baltic coun­
tries; all three played a different role from Poland 
and Finland (though Estonia has close ties to 
Finland and Lithuania to Poland). And Belarus 
seems to be an outlyer for most of the important 
similarities, as suggested by Szporluk's own dimin­
ished treatment of Belarus in comparison to the 
other cases. Ukraine, of course, both fits and 
doesn't fit the Soviet West, reflecting the historic 
divisions between western Ukraine and the more 
Russian (or Russified) eastern and southern 
Ukraine. These hesitations notwithstanding, the 
Soviet West is highly suggestive and worth pursuing 
further, but it needs more sustained exploration to 
make the case.
Washington, and London, 1976). Sec also The Soviet West: 
Interplay between Nationality and Social Organisation, ed. by Ralph 
S. (Hem (New York, Washington, London, 1975).
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Once we agree that there is something that holds 
together the Soviet West, we need to think about 
how geopohtically important it was as a region or 
sub-region. One might argue that in key moments 
of modern history, whether in the recent disman­
tling of the Soviet Union or the revolutionary end to 
the Russian Empire in 1917, the Caucasus has 
played an equally important role in transforming 
relations of power in the region. Certainly the 
Georgians and the Armenians claimed ancient 
kingdoms and “rediscovered” their national identity 
in the nineteenth century'; Armenia shared Ukraine's 
fate in being divided between empires, but also in 
being an imperial diaspora population. (True, 
neither the Armenians nor the Georgians had to 
“share” their ancient kingdoms with the Russians, as 
Ukrainians have had to contest Russia's claims to 
sole ownership of the Kyivan Rus' period in their 
own history.) The Armenians, Azeris, and Geor­
gians all had short-lived civil war-era states, similar 
to the Ukrainian (and to some degree the Belarusan) 
experiences; and particularly the Georgians and 
Armenians were able to preserve not only their 
language and literature, but distinctive alphabets 
(much as the Baltic republics fought to maintain 
their languages and Latin alphabets as distinct from 
the Cyrillicized written languages elsewhere in the 
USSR). The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict proved 
fatal for the Soviet elites' efforts to hold the multi­
national state together and became the first case of 
inter-ethnic violence on Soviet territory that could 
not be effectively contained.
In fairness, Szporluk does not attempt to raise 
the Soviet West to the prime cause of Soviet col­
lapse, but he suggests that that region posed the 
most intractable dilemmas for the Moscow leader­
ship. And he does attribute much of the credit for 
the relatively peaceful dismantling of the Soviet 
Union to the actions of Russians themselves, partic­
ularly those led by Boris Yeltsin (xxxvi). On the 
other hand, Szporluk's focus on the Soviet West 
offers a far more powerful explanation for the 
political crises that led to the dismantling of the 
Soviet Union than much of the analysis that ex­
pected the end to come from the forces of resurgent 
Islam in Central Asia.9 Still, Szporluk's intriguing 
theses await a more comprehensive and synthetic 
treatment of the role played by the “national ques­
tion” (and individual “national questions”) in the 
end of the Soviet state and political economy.
Russia, Eastern Europe and Europe
Another important theme is Szporluk's insis­
tence on returning the history of Eastern Europe 
and even Russia to a European history' that has been 
distortingly and misleadingly divided by the 
geopolitical struggle of the Cold War for the past 
half century' at least. The redrawn boundaries of 
post-1945 Europe were reproduced in a redrawing 
of intellectuals' boundaries which excised Russian 
history from that of Europe after 1917 and Eastern 
Europe's history' after 1945 (and by retroactive re­
periodization in effect excised all East European 
history) from NATO's reconfiguration as the telos 
and limits of Europe. Although communism was 
one spatial and temporal boundary that served to 
separate Eastern Europe from the “real” Europe, so 
too was East European nationalism used to segre­
gate specialists in the region from their counterparts 
who studied “normal” states and civil societies with 
healthy patriotism, rather than the versions that are 
described in often racialist terms as tribal or atavistic 
in the East.'0
In contrast, Szporluk insists on the European 
normality of much of East European national 
history. (He insists particularly' that Ukraine's 
history' is not all that different from the rest of 
Eastern Europe's.) For one, the nationalisms of 
Eastern Europe are not qualitatively different from 
analogous movements in Europe more generally, 
but share important commonalities in ideas of 
popular sovereignty, language and culture. True, the 
three dynastic empires (and USSR) that ruled over 
today's nations and successor states posed different 
challenges to nation-making elites in the East, and 
the sequence of state- and nation-building was 
different from that of the classic West European 
models. But Eastern Europe has shared in many' of 
the fundamental processes of modern European 
history and deserves broader sympathy' and more 
genuine understanding from those scholars who call 
themselves Europeanists than has been the case 
certainly for the past half century.
Though Szporluk appeals for Europeanists to 
relocate their conceptual boundaries farther to the 
east, he hesitantly draws the line somewhere west of 
Russia's current borders. (He, after all, sees the
This view was most forcefully propounded by Helene 
Carrcre D'Encausse in her Decline of the Soviet Empire: The 
Triumph of the Nations (New York, 1992). Szporluk himself 
makes only positive references to d'Encausse's work.
10 The most influential proponent of dividing the 
nationalisms of world history into good, civic ones and bad 
ethnic ones has been Liah Greenfeld, in Nationalism: Five 
Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, 1992).
33
THE HARRIMAN INSTITUTE
Soviet Far West as Europe's Far East.) The rela­
tionship of Russia to Europe, however defined, has 
today once again been raised on the policy and 
intellectual agenda. Martin Malia, at one end of the 
divide, asserts that Russia has returned to her 
European path of development after having been 
derailed first by World War I and then seventy years 
of alien, Soviet rule. He seeks to rehabilitate a 
westernizing, liberal, national alternative to Soviet 
ideocracy.11 Szporluk's view of Russia, by contrast, 
stresses greater continuity from the Imperial institu­
tions and ideologies to their Soviet, particularly 
Stalinist successors. Such a view aligns him more 
closely with an important antagonist of Malia's, 
Richard Pipes, who also emphasizes Russia's unfor­
tunate history of failed nation-building in the name 
of Empire and autocracy.12 In other words, for 
Szporluk, European means post-imperial (and 
Russia, in his opinion, has not attained that status 
yet), though the history of a couple important 
European powers, France and Britain, remind us 
that decolonization and deimperialization were also 
reluctantly undertaken only in the postwar years, 
and with often tragic consequences (witness, for 
example, the French-Algerian war).
The discussions about NATO and European 
Union expansion have given new life to these 
disagreements about Russia's place in Europe, and 
the views of Eastern and East Central Europeans 
are helping to shape those discussions. Szporluk's 
and Pipes' interwar Polish origins have influenced 
their own wrestling with the question of how 
"European" Russia can become, and their views are 
closer to the European (and I suspect American) 
mainstream than those of Malia. Still Szporluk 
reminds us, in the final analysis, that Ukraine's 
contemporary state- and nation-building projects, 
and possibly Ukraine's basic survival, hinge on the 
successful transformation of Russia to a democratic, 
civic, territorial nation. Many friends of independent 
Ukraine often appear to be wishing for the worst in 
Russia because they rue the historic domination of 
Ukraine by Russia. But a Russia excluded from 
Europe—from European institutions, norms, and 
values—would be a threat to Ukraine's own integra­
tion into Europe. After all, a starkly contrasting
11 See his under Western Eyes (Cambridge, Mass.,
and London, 1999); and The Soviet Tragedy (New York, 1994).
12 Lor Pipes' important statements on these issues, see his 
Russia under the 0Id Regime (New York, 1974); and The 
Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917- 
1929} (Cambridge, Mass., 1964). Geoffrey Ilosking has also 
recently reformulated this thesis in Russia: Feople and Empire 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1997).
model of post-Soviet state relations is that of 
Belarus and Russia in their solemnly proclaimed 
union. Belarus's leadership appears to be willing to 
cede considerable sovereignty to the union and to 
restrict the processes of democratization inside 
Belarus', and such concessions encourage neo­
imperialist thinking inside Russia (and among 
certain circles in Ukraine) as well.
And just as many Russians today blame “Soviet 
legacies”for their contemporary difficulties rather 
than facing up to their own mistaken policies, so, 
too, many Ukrainian political leaders blame “the 
Russian factor”for most of Ukraine's contemporary 
woes rather than admit their own lack of imagina­
tion and political will. This does not mean we 
should turn a blind eye to Russian policies or trends 
that run counter to European or Euro-Atlantic 
interests and values, nor is it a denial of the consid­
erable institutional and social-psychological legacies 
of the Soviet system and Russian domination in that 
system, but too often this type of laying blame 
becomes ideology rather than objective analysis of 
the situation. However the issues of legacies are to 
be resolved, Ukrainian-Russian relations are likely to 
be very important for the foreseeable future. Those 
who hope for the survival and growth of an inde­
pendent Ukraine should also hope for a truly demo­
cratic Russian neighbor. The survival of an inde­
pendent Ukraine in itself will be an important 
indicator of Russia's successful deimperialization, 
or, in Szporluk's understanding, its Europeanization.
Alternative Geopolitical Imaginaries and 
Periodizations
The theme of Russia's reformability is tied to 
Szporluk's search in the region's history for alternate 
political and geopolitical arrangements that would 
have permitted greater accommodation of national 
cultures, identities, institutions, and elites in the 
contexts of the Soviet bloc. Sadly, it is a search that 
leads to the gradual erosion of his hope in the 
Soviet elites' capacity and willingness to redress the 
inequities of Soviet nationality policies and policy 
toward Eastern Europe. Early on, the Bolsheviks' 
own nationality policies during the 1920s, the period 
of korenizfitsiia, offered some hope for a more 
equitable balancing of powers between the domi­
nant Russians and subordinate non-Russians. And 
Szporluk insists that Lenin himself had a good 
appreciation of the Ukrainian question, even if 
Lenin's views remained a distinct minority opinion
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in the Bolshevik leadership.13 Elsewhere in the 
region both Tomas Masaryk’s alternate vision of the 
political arrangement of post-1918 East and East 
Central Europe (p. 263) and the Prague reforms of 
1968 (p. 14), one element of which was to restore 
equality in the relations between Czechs and Slovaks 
in Czechoslovakia, held out hope, in turn, for Soviet 
reforms of inter-state East European and intra- 
Soviet national relations. Szporluk also explores the 
Yugoslav solution of extraterritorial cultural identity 
as a possible option for the Soviet Union (p. 59).14
F
rom a perspective that is sensitive to alterna­
tive paths of development, Szporluk argues 
for a periodization of the Russian-Ukrainian 
relationship that is marked by the following 
important years: 1922, the first "resolution" of the 
Soviet national question in the structure of the 
USSR, a structure which under Stalin would be 
proclaimed as a universal model for all states, most 
importantly those in East Central and Southeastern 
Europe after World War II; 1939-45, a violent 
extension of that Soviet model of nation-building to 
a region that had had considerable alternative 
experience, first Far Eastern Europe, later Eastern 
Europe after the wartime victory; 1956-68, from the 
realignment of power after Stalin's death that per­
mitted a doctrinal reassessment of Soviet experience 
and the brief tolerance of multiple national roads to 
socialism until the repudiation of East European 
experience and the reassertion of the Soviet model 
as universal after the Prague Spring; 1988/91, the 
dismantling of the East European bloc and then the 
Soviet Union itself.
I might reformulate the first important turning 
point in the Russian-Ukrainian encounter by adding 
World War I, the revolutionary and civil war years, 
1914-1923. The war militarized and international­
ized the Russian, Ottoman and Austro-EIungarian
13 Mikhail Pokrovskii, the subject of Szporluk's earlier 
scholarship, set the goal of Soviet history-writing to overcome 
the Russian chauvinist and imperialist legacies of pre-
revolutionary Russia. But also the dissident critique of Soviet 
nationality policy articulated by Ivan Dziuba in Internationalism 
or Russf cation? (New York, 1974) influenced Szporluk's 
thinking; Dziuba argued that Stalinist nationality policies 
violated the more enlightened programs of the Leninist 
1920s. On Lenin's views being those of the minority, see a 
recent study by ,eremy Smith, The Bolsheviks and the National 
Question, 1917-1923 (New York, 1999); on the politics and 
practice of korenfatsiia "in Ukraine, see George Liber, Soviet 
Nationality Polity, Urban Growth, and Identity Change in the 
Ukrainian SSR, 1923-1934 (Cambridge, 1992).
14 See chapter 2 in the volume under review for a 
discussion of reformist alternatives to Soviet policies.
Empires' nationalities politics, including tire expecta­
tions of “all-Russian” and Ukrainian political and 
intellectual elites. The revolution of 1917 marked 
the first steps in Ukrainian state-and nation-building 
in conditions of relative democracy, and the civil 
war years confronted the White armies and the 
Bolshevik leadership with their first experience of 
Ukrainian states, even if semi-sovereign and even if 
short-lived. (And, after all, how sovereign were 
either the White Governments or even the 
Bolsheviks during the civil war years?) As with 
other periods of transformation in the Russian- 
Ukrainian relationship, so too this set of realign­
ments did not happen in isolation from broader 
processes of change in class, national identity and 
other political loyalties. In large measure, the 1922 
Constitution of the USSR is a legacy of that period's 
wrenching transformations. Geoff Eley has made a 
persuasive case for such a periodization (1914- 
1923), and this chronological remapping also offers 
the possibility of bringing historians of Eastern and 
Western Europe together in new ways, in other 
words of integrating East European history into the 
narrative of an expanded Europe's past.13
Szporluk's essays touch on many other issues, 
but the grand questions of relations between Russia 
and Ukraine, the futures of Europe and Empire, are 
key for rethinking the meaning of the twentieth 
century and remain firmly on the geopolitical agen­
das of today's policymakers in the region and be­
yond. Elis ambivalence about Russia's relationship 
to Europe reflects the very' real doubts and misgiv­
ings in both European countries and Russian elites 
about Europe's new borders. His suggestions for 
rethinking the periodization of the twentieth century 
in Eastern Europe promise greater dialogue with 
historians of western Europe.
To Wayne Vucinich, one of Szporluk's Stanford 
University teachers and a veteran nationalities 
specialist himself, we owe thanks for arranging with 
Hoover Press to publish these essays, but above all, 
Roman Szporluk has earned our gratitude for 
challenging conventional wisdom and imaginary'. 
geopolitical boundaries.
Columbia Unlverslly
15 Sec Geoff Eley, "Remapping the Nation: War, 
Revolutionary Upheaval and State Formation in Eastern 
Europe, 1914-1923," in P. ,. Potichnyi and I I. Aster, eds., 
Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective (Edmonton, 
1988), pp. 205-46. Lor more on my attempt at rethinking the 
place of the Ukrainian revolution in the events of 1914-1923, 
sec my essay "Ukraine," in Acton, Cherniaev, and Rosenberg, 
eds., Critical Companion to the Russian Revolution, 1914-1921 
(London, 1997), pp. 728-40.
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